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Abstract
We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an
opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the
learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous approaches
consider known opponent models, we focus on the setting in which the opponent’s
model is unknown. To this end, we use kernel-based regularity assumptions
to capture and exploit the structure in the opponent’s response. We propose a
novel algorithm for the learner when playing against an adversarial sequence of
opponents. The algorithm combines ideas from bilevel optimization and online
learning to effectively balance between exploration (learning about the opponent’s
model) and exploitation (selecting highly rewarding actions for the learner). Our
results include algorithm’s regret guarantees that depend on the regularity of the
opponent’s response and scale sublinearly with the number of game rounds. More-
over, we specialize our approach to repeated Stackelberg games, and empirically
demonstrate its effectiveness in a traffic routing and wildlife conservation task.
1 Introduction
Several important real-world problems involve sequential interactions between two parties. These
problems can often be modeled as two-player games, where the first player chooses a strategy and
the second player responds to it. For example, in traffic networks, traffic operators plan routes for a
subset of network vehicles (e.g., public transport), while the remaining vehicles (e.g., private cars)
can choose their routes in response to that. The goal of the first player in these games is to find the
optimal strategy (e.g., traffic operators seek the routing strategy that minimizes the overall network’s
congestion, cf., [19]). Several algorithms have been previously proposed, successfully deployed, and
used in domains such as urban roads [16], airport security [28], wildlife protection [38], and markets
[14], to name a few.
In many applications, complete knowledge of the game is not available, and thus, finding a good
strategy for the first player becomes more challenging. The response function of the second player,
that is, how the second player responds to strategies of the first player, is typically unknown and
can only be inferred by repeatedly playing and observing the responses and game outcomes [21, 5].
Consequently, we refer to the first and second players as learner and opponent, respectively. An
additional challenge for the learner in such repeated games lies in facing a potentially different type
of opponent at every game round. In various domains (e.g., in security applications), the learner can
even face an adversarially chosen sequence of opponent/attacker types [3].
Motivated by these important considerations, we study a repeated sequential game against an un-
known opponent with multiple types. We propose a novel algorithm for the learner when facing
an adversarially chosen sequence of types. No-regret guarantees of our algorithm in these settings
ensure that the learner’s performance converges to the optimal one in hindsight (i.e., the idealized
scenario in which the types’ sequence and opponent’s response function are known ahead of time).
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To that end, our algorithm learns the opponent’s response function online, and gradually improves the
learner’s strategy throughout the game.
Related work. Most previous works consider sequential games where the goal is to play against a
single type of opponent. Authors of [21] and [27] show that an optimal strategy for the learner can
be obtained by observing a polynomial number of opponent’s responses. In security applications,
methods by [33] and [18] learn the opponent’s response function by using PAC-based and decision-
tree behavioral models, respectively. Recently, single opponent modeling has also been studied in the
context of deep reinforcement learning, e.g., [13, 29, 35, 12]. While all these approaches exhibit good
empirical performance, they do not consider multiple types of opponents and lack regret guarantees.
Playing against multiple types of opponents has been considered in Bayesian Stackelberg games
[26, 15, 24], where the opponent’s types are drawn from a known probability distribution. In [4], the
authors propose no-regret algorithms when opponents’ behavioral models are available to the learner.
In this work, we make no such distributional or availability assumptions, and our results hold for
adversarially selected sequences of opponent’s types. This is similar to the work [3], in which the
authors propose a no-regret online learning algorithm to play repeated Stackelberg games [37]. In
contrast, we consider a more challenging setting in which opponents’ utilities are unknown and focus
on learning the opponent’s response function from observing the opponent’s responses.
Contributions. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We propose STACKELUCB, a novel algorithm for playing sequential games versus an adversarially
chosen sequence of opponent’s types. Moreover, we also specialize our approach to the case in
which the same type of opponent is faced at every round.
• We model the correlation present in the opponent’s responses via kernel-based regularity assump-
tions, and prove the first sublinear kernel-based regret bounds.
• We consider repeated Stackelberg games with unknown opponents, and specialize our approach
and regret bounds to this class of games.
• Finally, we experimentally validate the performance of our algorithms in traffic routing and wildlife
conservation tasks, where they consistently outperform other baselines.
2 Problem Setup
We consider a sequential two-player repeated game between the learner and its opponent. The set
of actions that are available to the learner and opponent in every round of the game are denoted by
X and Y , respectively. The learner seeks to maximize its reward function r(x, y) that depends on
actions played by both players, x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . In every round of the game, the learner can face
an opponent of different type θt ∈ Θ that is unknown to the learner at the decision time. As the
sequence of opponent’s types can be chosen adversarially, we focus on randomized strategies for the
learner as explained below. We summarize the protocol of the repeated sequential game as follows.
In every game round t:
1. The learner computes a randomized strategy pt, i.e., a probability distribution over X , and
samples action xt ∼ pt.
2. The opponent observes xt and responds by selecting yt = b(xt, θt), where b : X × Θ → Y
represents the opponent’s response function.
3. The learner observes the opponent’s type θt and response yt, and receives reward r(xt, yt).
The opponent’s types {θi}Ti=1 can be chosen by an adaptive adversary, i.e., at round t, the type θt can
depend on the sequence of randomized strategies {pi}ti=1 of the learner and on the previous realized
actions x1, . . . , xt−1 (but not on the current action xt). The goal of the learner is to maximize the
cumulative reward
∑T
t=1 r(xt, yt) over T rounds of the game. We assume that the learner knows its
reward function r(·, ·), while the opponent’s response function b(·, ·) is unknown. To achieve this
goal, the learner has to repeatedly play the game and learn about the opponent’s response function
from the received feedback. After T game rounds, the performance of the learner is measured via the
cumulative regret:
R(T ) = max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
r(x, b(x, θt))−
T∑
t=1
r(xt, yt). (1)
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The regret represents the difference between the cumulative reward of a single best action from X and
the sum of the obtained rewards. An algorithm is said to be no-regret if R(T )/T → 0 as T →∞.
Regularity assumptions. Attaining sub-linear regret is not possible in general for arbitrary response
functions and domains, and hence, this requires further regularity assumptions. We consider a finite
set of actions X ⊂ Rd available to the learner, and a finite set of opponent’s types Θ ⊂ Rp. We
assume the unknown response function b(x, θ) is a member of a reproducing kernel Hilbert space
Hk (RKHS), induced by some known positive-definite kernel function k(x, θ, x′, θ′). RKHSHk is a
Hilbert space of (typically non-linear) well-behaved functions b(·, ·) with inner product 〈·, ·〉k and
norm ‖ · ‖k = 〈·, ·〉1/2k , such that b(x, θ) = 〈b, k(·, ·, x, θ)〉k for every x ∈ X , θ ∈ Θ and b ∈ Hk.
The RKHS norm measures smoothness of b with respect to the kernel function k (it holds ‖b‖k <∞
iff b ∈ Hk). We assume a known boundB > 0 on the RKHS norm of the unknown response function,
i.e., ‖b‖k ≤ B. This assumption encodes the fact that similar opponent types and strategies of the
learner lead to similar responses. This similarity is measured by the known kernel function that
satisfies k(x, θ, x′, θ′) ≤ 1 for any feasible inputs.1 Most popularly used kernel functions that we
also consider are linear, squared-exponential (RBF) and Matérn kernels [30].
Our second regularity assumption is regarding the learner’s reward function r : X × Y → [0, 1],
which we assume is Lr-Lipschitz continuous with respect to ‖ · ‖1.
3 Proposed Approach
The observed opponent’s response can often contain some observational noise, e.g., in wildlife protec-
tion (see Section 4.2), we only get to observe an imprecise/inexact poaching location. Hence, instead
of directly observing b(xt, θt) at every round t, the learner receives a noisy response yt = b(xt, θt)+t.
For the sake of clarity, we consider the case of scalar responses, i.e., yt ∈ R, but in Appendix A, we
also consider the case of vector-valued responses. We let Ht = {{(xi, θi, yi, )}t−1i=1, (xt, θt)}, and
assume E[t|Ht] = 0 and t is conditionally σ-sub-Gaussian, i.e., E
[
exp(ζt)|Ht
] ≤ exp(ζ2σ2/2)
for any ζ ∈ R.
At every round t, by using the previously collected data {(xi, θi, yi)}t−1i=1 , we can compute a mean
estimate of the opponent’s response function via standard kernel ridge regression. This can be
obtained in closed-form as:
µt(x, θ) = kt(x, θ)
T
(
Kt + λIt
)−1
yt , (2)
where yt = [y1, . . . , yt]
T is the vector of observations, λ > 0 is a regularization parameter,
kt(x, θ) = [k(x, θ, x1, θ1), . . . , k(x, θ, xt, θt)]
T and [Kt]i,j = k(xi, θi, xj , θj) is the kernel matrix.
We also note that µt(·, ·) can be seen as the posterior mean function of the corresponding Bayesian
Gaussian process model [30]. The variance of the proposed estimator can be obtained as:
σ2t (x, θ) = k(x, θ, x, θ)− kt(x, θ)T
(
Kt + λIt
)−1
kt(x, θ) . (3)
Moreover, we can use (2) and (3) to construct upper and lower confidence bound functions:
ucbt(x, θ) := µt(x, θ) + βtσt(x, θ), lcbt(x, θ) := µt(x, θ)− βtσt(x, θ) , (4)
respectively, for every x ∈ X , θ ∈ Θ, where βt is a confidence parameter. A standard result from [1,
34] (see Lemma 4 in Appendix A) shows that under our regularity assumptions, βt can be set such that,
with high probability, response b(x, θ) ∈ [lcbt(x, θ), ucbt(x, θ)] for every (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ and t ≥ 1.
Finally, before moving to our main results, we define a sample complexity parameter that quantifies
the maximum information gain about the unknown function from noisy observations:
γt := max{(xi,θi)}ti=1
0.5 log det(It +Kt/λ). (5)
It has been introduced by [34] and later on used in various theoretical works on Bayesian optimization.
Analytical bounds that are sublinear in t are known for popularly used kernels [34], e.g., when
X ×Θ ⊂ Rd, we have γt ≤ O(log(t)d+1) and γt ≤ O(d log(t)) for squared exponential and linear
kernels, respectively. This quantity characterizes the regret bounds obtained in the next sections.
1Our results also holds when k(x, θ, x′, θ′) ≤ L for some L > 0 (see Proof C for details).
3
Algorithm 1 The STACKELUCB algorithm (Playing vs. Sequence of Unknown Opponents)
Input: Finite action set X ⊂ Rd, kernel k(·, ·), parameters λ, {βt}t≥1, η
1: Initialize: Uniform strategy p1 = 1|X |1|X |
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: Sample action xt ∼ pt // Opponent θt observes xt and computes b(xt, θt)
4: Observe θt and noisy response yt = b(xt, θt) + t
5: Compute optimistic reward estimates:
∀x ∈ X : r˜t(x, θt) := maxy r(x, y), s.t. y ∈
[
lcbt(x, θt), ucbt(x, θt)
]
6: Perform strategy update: ∀x ∈ X : pt+1[x] ∝ pt[x] · exp
(
η · r˜t(x, θt)
)
7: Update: µt+1, σt+1 with {(xt, θt, yt)} (via (2), (3)), and ucbt+1, lcbt+1 (via (4))
8: end for
3.1 The STACKELUCB Algorithm
The considered problem (Section 2) can be seen as an instance of adversarial online learning [7]
in which an adversary chooses a reward function rt(·) in every round t, while the learner (without
knowing the reward function) selects action xt and subsequently receives reward rt(xt). To achieve
no-regret, the learner needs to maintain a probability distribution over the set X of available actions
and play randomly according to it. Recall that we consider a finite set of actions X ⊂ Rd and we let
pt denote the probability distribution (vector) supported on X . At every round, the learner then plays
action xt ∼ pt and subsequently updates its strategy to pt+1.
Multiplicative Weights (MW) [23] algorithms such as EXP3 [2] and HEDGE [11] are popular no-regret
methods for updating pt, depending on the feedback available to the learner in every round. The
former only needs observing reward of the played action rt(xt) (bandit feedback), while the latter
requires access to the entire reward function rt(·) at every t (full-information feedback).
The considered game setup corresponds (from the learner’s perspective) to the particular online
learning problem in which rt(·) := r(·, b(·, θt)), type θt is revealed, and the bandit observation yt is
observed by the learner. Full-information feedback, however, is not available as b(·, θt) is unknown.
To alleviate this, similarly to [31], we compute "optimistic" reward estimates to emulate the full-
information feedback. Based on previously observed data, we establish upper and lower confidence
bounds ucbt(·) and lcbt(·), of the opponent’s response function (via (4) and Lemma 4, Appendix A).
These are then used to estimate the optimistic rewards of the learner for any x ∈ X at round t as:
r˜t(x, θt) := max
y
r(x, y) s.t. y ∈ [lcbt(x, θt), ucbt(x, θt)]. (6)
We note that the learner’s reward function is assumed to be known and that can be efficiently optimized
for any fixed x. The latter assumption is realistic given that in many applications the learner can often
choose its own objective (see examples in Section 4). For example, in case r(x, ·) is a concave func-
tion, the problem in (6) corresponds to concave function maximization subject to convex constraints
which can be performed efficiently via standard gradient-based methods. Optimistic rewards allow
the learner to control the maximum incurred regret, while Lipschitness of r(.) ensures that learning
the opponent’s response function (via (2) and (3)) translates to more accurate reward estimates.
We are now in position to descibe our novel STACKELUCB algorithm for the learner (see Algorithm 1).
STACKELUCB maintains a distribution pt over X , and samples actions xt ∼ pt at every round.
It maintains confidence bounds of the opponent’s response function b(·, ·) by using the previously
obtained opponent’s responses (via (2)-(3)). For each x ∈ X , optimistic rewards r˜(x, θt) are
computed via (6) and used to emulate the full-information feedback. Finally, the distribution pt
is updated by the standard MW update rule: pt+1[x] ∝ pt[x] · exp
(
η · r˜t(x, θt)
)
, where η is the
learning step set as in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Consider the setting with multiple opponent types from Θ, and assume the learner’s
reward function is Lr-Lipschitz continuous. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), the regret of STACKELUCB
when used with λ ≥ 1, βt = σλ−1
√
2 log ( 1δ ) + log(det(It +Kt/λ)) + λ
−1/2B, and learning step
η =
√
8 log(|X |)/T , is bounded, with probability at least 1− 2δ, by
R(T ) ≤
√
1
2T log |X |+
√
1
2T log (
1
δ ) + 4LrβT
√
TλγT ,
where B ≥ ‖b‖Hk and γT is the maximum information gain defined in (5).
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The obtained regret bound scales sublinearly with T , and depends on the regret obtained from
playing HEDGE (first two terms) and learning of the opponent’s response function (last term in
the regret bound). We note that EXP3 attains O(√T |X | log |X |) while HEDGE attains improved
O(√T log |X |) regret bound which scales favourably with the number of available actions |X |. The
same holds for our algorithm, but crucially – unlike HEDGE – our algorithm uses the bandit feedback
only.
Next, we consider a special case of a single opponent type, while in Section 3.3, we show how
STACKELUCB can be used to play unknown repeated Stackelberg games.
3.2 Single Opponent Type
We now consider the special case where the learner is playing against the opponent of a single known
type at every round of the game, i.e., θt = θ¯. The goal of the learner is to compete with the action
that is the solution of the following problem:
max
x∈X
r(x, y) s.t. y = b(x, θ¯). (7)
Even in this simpler setting, the learner cannot directly optimize (7), since the opponent’s response
function b(·, θ¯) is unknown, and can only be inferred by repeatedly playing the game and observing
its outcomes. The problem in (7) is a special instance of bilevel optimization [32] in which the
lower-level function is unknown.
Next, we show that the learner can achieve no-regret by using the estimator, used in STACKELUCB,
from (6), and following a simple yet effective strategy. At every round t, it consists of using the past
observed data {(xτ , yτ , θ¯)}t−1τ=1 to build the confidence bounds as in (4), and selecting the action that
maximizes the optimistic reward:
xt = arg max
x∈X
r˜t
(
x, θ¯
)
. (8)
This bilevel strategy is reminiscent of the single level GP-UCB algorithm used in standard Bayesian
optimization [34], and leads to the following guarantee:
Corollary 2 Consider the setting where the learner plays against the same opponent θ¯ ∈ Θ in every
game round, and assume the learner’s reward function is Lr-Lipschitz continuous. Then for any
δ ∈ (0, 1), the regret of the learner when playing according to (8) with βt set as in Theorem 1 and
λ ≥ 1, is bounded with probability at least 1− δ by
R(T ) ≤ 4LrβT
√
TλγT ,
where ‖b‖Hk ≤ B and γT is the maximum information gain as defined in (5).
The obtained bilevel regret rate is a constant factor Lr worse in comparison to the rate of the standard
single-level bandit optimization [34], and reflects the additional dependence of the learner’s reward
function on the opponent’s response. Moreover, it shows that in the case of a single opponent the
learner can achieve better regret guarantees compared to Theorem 1. Finally, we note that one could
also consider modeling and optimizing g(·) = r(·, b(·, θ¯)) directly (as a single unknown objective),
but this can lead to worse performance as reasoned and empirically demonstrated in Section 4.2.
3.3 Learning in Repeated Stackelberg Games
We consider Stackelberg games [37] and show how they can be mapped to our general problem setup
from Section 2. A Stackelberg game is played between two players: the leader, who plays first, and
the follower who best-responds to the leader’s move.2 Moreover, in a repeated Stackelberg game
(e.g., [21, 24]), leader and follower play repeated rounds, while the leader can (as before) face a
potentially different type of follower at every round [3]. In Stackelberg games, at every round the
leader commits to a mixed strategy (i.e., a probability distribution over the actions): If we let nl be
the number of actions available to the leader, we can map repeated Stackelberg games to our setup by
letting xt ∈ X = ∆nl be the leader’s mixed strategy at time t, where ∆nl stands for nl-dimensional
simplex. 3 Moreover, the opponent’s response function in a Stackelberg game assumes the specific
best-response form b(xt, θt) = arg maxy∈Y Uθt(xt, y), where Uθt(x, y) represents the expected
utility of the follower of type θt under the leader’s mixed strategy x (as in [3] we assume the
2In accordance with this terminology, we use leader and follower to refer to learner and opponent, respectively.
3Unlike the previous section where xt belongs to a finite set X , in this section, the set X = ∆nl is infinite.
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follower breaks ties in an arbitrary but consistent manner so that b(x, θt) is a singleton). We note
that our regularity assumptions of Section 2 enforce smoothness in the follower’s best-response
and indirectly depend on the structure of the function Uθ(·, ·) and on the follower’s decision set Y
(similar regularity conditions are used in other works on bilevel optimization, e.g., [10, 22]). Without
further assumptions on the follower’s types (see, e.g., [26, 15] for Bayesian type assumptions), the
goal of the leader is to obtain sublinear regret as defined in Eq. (1).
Our approach is inspired by [3], where the authors consider the case in which the leader has complete
knowledge of the set of possible follower types Θ and utilities Uθ(·, ·) and show that it can achieve
no-regret by considering a carefully constructed (via discretization) finite subset of mixed strategies.
In this work, we consider the more challenging scenario in which these utilities are unknown to the
leader and hence the follower’s response function can only be learned throughout the game. Moreover,
differently from [3], we consider infinite action sets available to the follower. Under our regularity
assumptions, we show that the leader can attain no-regret by using STACKELUCB over a discretized
mixed strategy set.
We let D be the finite discretization (uniform grid) of the leader’s mixed strategy space ∆nl with size
|D| = (Lr(1 + Lb)
√
nlT )
nl chosen such that:
‖x− [x]D‖1 ≤ (Lr(1 + Lb))−1
√
nl /T , ∀x ∈ ∆nl , (9)
where [x]D is the closest point to x in D. Before stating the main result of this section, we further
assume that the follower’s response function b(·, ·) is Lb-Lipschitz continuous, so that differences in
the follower’s responses can be bounded in D.4
Corollary 3 Consider a repeated Stackelberg game with nl actions available to the leader. Let the
leader use STACKELUCB with D from (9) to sample a mixed strategy at every round. Then for any
δ ∈ (0, 1), when STACKELUCB is run with λ ≥ 1, βt is set as in Theorem 1 and η =
√
8 log(|D|)/T ,
the regret of the leader is bounded, with probability at least 1− 2δ, by
R(T ) ≤
√
1
2Tnl log
(
Lr(1 + Lb)
√
nlT
)
+
√
Tnl +
√
1
2T log
(
1
δ
)
+ 4LrβT
√
TλγT .
Compared to the O(√T · poly(nl, nf , kf )) regret of [3] (nf and kf are the numbers of actions
available to the follower and possible follower types, respectively), our regret bound also scales
sublinearly with T and, unlike the result of [3], it holds when playing against followers with unknown
utilities (also, potentially infinite number of follower types). The last term in our regret bound can
be interpreted as the price of not knowing such utilities ahead of time. We remark that while both
ours and [3]’s approaches are no-regret, they are both computationally inefficient since the number of
considered mixed strategies (e.g., in Line 6 of Algorithm 1) is exponential in nl.
4 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the proposed algorithms in traffic routing and wildlife conservation tasks.
4.1 Routing Vehicles in Congested Traffic Networks
We use the road traffic network of Sioux-Falls [20], which can be represented as a directed graph
with 24 nodes and 76 edges e ∈ E. We consider the traffic routing task in which the goal of the
network operator (e.g., the local traffic authority) is to route 300 units (e.g., a fleet of autonomous
vehicles) between the two nodes of the network (depicted as blue and green nodes in Figure 1). At
the same time, the goal of the operator is to avoid the network becoming overly congested. We model
this problem as a repeated sequential game (as defined in Section 2) between the network operator
(learner) and the rest of the users present in the network (opponent). We evaluate the performance of
the operator when using STACKELUCB to select routes.
We consider a finite set X of possible routing plans for the operator (generated as in Appendix E). At
each round t, the routing plan chosen by the network operator can be represented by the vector xt ∈
R|E|≥0 , where xt[i] represents units that are routed through edge i ∈ E. We let the type vector θt ∈ R552≥0
represent the demand profile of the network users at round t, where each entry indicates the number
of users that want to travel between any pair (552 pairs in total) of nodes in the network. The network
4In fact, Lipschitzness of b(·, ·) is implied by the RKHS norm bound assumption and certain properties of
the used kernel function (see [9, Lemma 1] for details).
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Shortest route 0% routed STACKELUCB
Avg. congestion 15.97 1.03 3.51
Cumul. reward 21’645.4 -813.5 25’330.5
Figure 1: Left: Time-averaged regret of the operator using different routing strategies. STACKELUCB (poly-
nomial kernels of degree 3 or 4) leads to a smaller regret compared to the considered baselines and performs
comparably to the idealized HEDGE algorithm. Right: Edges’ congestion (color intensity proportional to the
time-averaged congestion computed as in Appendix E) when the operator at each round: (left) Routes 100% of
the units via the shortest route, (middle) Routes 0% of units, and (right) Uses STACKELUCB. When 100% of
the units are routed via the shortest route the central edges are extremely congested. The congestion is reduced
with STACKELUCB because alternative routes are selected. We report the respective average congestion levels
and operator’s cumulative rewards in the table.
users observe the operator’s routing plan xt and choose their routes according to their preferences.
This results in a certain congestion level of the network. We represent such level as the average
congestion of the edges yt = b(xt, θt) ∈ R+, where b(·, ·) captures both the users’ preferences and
the network’s congestion model (see Appendix E for details) and is unknown to the operator.
Given routing plan xt and congestion yt, we use the following reward function for the operator:
r(xt, yt) = g(xt)− κ · yt, where g(xt) represents the total number of units routed to the operator’s
destination node at round t and κ > 0 stands for a trade-off parameter. This parameter balances the
two opposing objectives of the operator, i.e., routing a large number of units versus decreasing the
overall network congestion. At the end of each round, the operator observes yt and θt and updates the
routing strategy. Network’s data and congestion model are based on [20], and a detailed description
of our experimental setup is provided in Appendix E.
We compare the performance of the network operator when using STACKELUCB with the ones
achieved by 1) routing 100% of the units via the shortest route at every round, 2) routing 0%
of the units at every round, 3) the EXP3 algorithm and 4) the HEDGE algorithm. In this case,
HEDGE corresponds to the algorithm by [3] and represents an unrealistic benchmark because the
full-information feedback is not available to the network operator since the function b(·, ·) is unknown.
We run STACKELUCB with polynomial kernels of degree 3 or 4 (polynomial functions are typically
used as good congestion models, cf., [20]), set η according to Theorem 1 and use βt = 0.5 (we
also observed, as in [34], that theory-informed values for βt are overly conservative). Kernel
hyperparameters are computed offline via maximum-likelihood over 100 randomly generated points.
STACKELUCB leads to a significantly smaller regret compared to the considered baselines, as shown
in Figure 1 (the regret of baseline 2 is above the y-axis limit), and its performance is comparable
to the full-information HEDGE algorithm. Moreover, we report the cumulative reward obtained
by the operator when using STACKELUCB and other two baselines, together with the resulting
time-averaged congestion levels. The network’s average congestion is very low when 0% of the
units are routed, while the central edges become extremely congested when 100% of the units are
routed via the shortest route. Instead, the proposed game model and STACKELUCB algorithm
allow the operator to select alternative routes depending on the users’ demands, leading to improved
congestion and a larger cumulative reward compared to the baselines.
4.2 Wildlife Protection against Poaching Activity
We consider a wildlife conservation task where the goal of park rangers is to protect animals from
poaching activities. We model this problem as a sequential game between the rangers, who commit to
a patrol strategy, and the poachers that observe the rangers’ strategy to decide upon a poaching location
[38, 17]. We study the repeated version of this game in which the rangers start with no information
about the poachers’ model and use Algorithm (8) to discover the best patrol strategy online.
We consider the game model of [17] that we briefly summarize below. The park area is divided
into 25 disjoint cells (see Figure 2). A possible patrol strategy for the rangers is represented by
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Figure 2: Left: Obtained rewards when the rangers know the poachers’ model (OPT), assume the worst possible
poaching location (Max-Min), estimate the poachers’ model by using 1’000 offline data points (Best-offline),
or use Algorithm (8) to update their patrol strategy online. Our algorithm discovers the optimal strategy in ∼60
rounds and outperforms the considered baselines. Right: Park animal density (left plot) and rangers’ mixed
strategy (right plot, where probabilities are proportional to the green color intensity) computed with Algorithm (8).
The poachers’ model and starting location (red square) are not known by the rangers ahead of time.
the mixed strategy vector x ∈ [0, 1]25, where x[i] represents the coverage probability of cell i. The
poachers are aware of the rangers’ patrol strategy and can use it to determine a poaching location
y ∈ R2. Given patrol strategy x and poaching location y, the expected utility of the rangers is
r(x, y) =
∑25
i=1
(
x[i] · Rri + (1 − x[i]) · P ri
)
· 1i(y), where 1i(y) ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether
location y belongs to cell i, Rri > 0 and P
r
i < 0 are reward and penalty for covering / not covering
cell i, respectively. The poaching location is chosen based on the Subjective Utility (SU) model [25]
y = b(x) = arg maxy SU(·, y), which we detail in Appendix F. The function SU(x, y) trades-off
the animal density at location y (see right plots in Figure 2; here, such density was generated as
a mixture of Gaussian distributions to simulate distinct high animal density areas), the distance
between y and the poachers’ starting location (e.g., we use the starting location depicted as red square
in Figure 2), and the rangers’ coverage probabilities x. Based on this model, the goal of the rangers is
to discover the optimal patrol strategy x that maximizes r(x, b(x)), despite not knowing the poachers’
response function b(·). This is an instance of the single type problem considered in Section 3.2.
We consider a repeated version of this game where, at each round, the rangers choose a patrol
strategy xt, obtain a noisy observation of the poaching location yt = b(xt) + t, and use this data
to improve their strategy according to Algorithm (8). The decision set X of the rangers consists
of 500 mixed strategies randomly sampled from the simplex and 25 pure strategies (i.e., covering
a single cell with probability 1). We use the Màtern kernel defined over the vectors (x, θ¯) where
θ¯ ∈ R25 represents the maximal animal density in each of the park cells and can be interpreted as
the single (and known) opponent’s type. In Figure 2 (left plot), we compare the performance of our
algorithm with the ones achieved by: 1) Optimal strategy (OPT) x? = arg maxx∈X r(x, b(x)) with
known poachers’ model, 2) Max-Min, i.e, xm = arg maxx∈X miny r(x, y), which assumes the worst
possible poaching location, and 3) Best-offline, that is, xo = arg maxx∈X r(x, µo(x)), where µo(·)
is the mean estimate of b(·) computed offline as in (2) by using 1’000 random data points. We average
the obtained results over 10 different runs. Our algorithm outperforms the considered baselines
and discovers the optimal patrol strategy after ∼ 60 rounds. In Appendix F, we also show that our
approach outperforms the standard GP bandit algorithm GP-UCB [34] which ignores the rewards’
bi-level structure and directly tries to learn the function g(·) = r(·, b(·, θ¯)). Finally, in Figure 2
(rightmost plot), we show the optimal strategy discovered by our algorithm despite not knowing the
poachers’ model (and starting location). We observe that the cells covered with higher probabilities
are the ones with a high animal density near to the poachers’ starting location.
5 Conclusions
We have considered the problem of learning to play repeated sequential games versus unknown
opponents. We have proposed an online algorithm for the learner, when facing adversarial opponents,
that attains sublinear regret guarantees by imposing kernel-based regularity assumptions on the
opponents’ response function. Furthermore, we have shown that our approach can be specialized
to repeated Stackelberg games and demonstrated its applicability in experiments from traffic routing
and wildlife conservation. An interesting direction for future work is to consider adding additional
structure into opponents’ responses by, e.g., incorporating bounded-rationality models of opponents
as considered by [38] and [6].
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Broader Impact
Our approach is motivated by sequential decision-making problems that arise in several domains such
as road traffic, markets, and security applications with potentially significant societal benefits. In such
domains, it is important to predict how the system responds to any given decision and take this into
account to achieve the desired performance. The methods proposed in this paper require to observe
and quantify (via suitable indicators) the response of the system and to dispose of computational
resources to process the observed data. Moreover, it is important that the integrity and the reliability
of such data are verified, and that the used algorithms are complemented with suitable measures that
ensure the safety of the system at any point in time.
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Supplementary Material
Learning to Play Sequential Games versus Unknown Opponents
Pier Giuseppe Sessa, Ilija Bogunovic, Maryam Kamgarpour, Andreas Krause
A RKSH Regression and Confidence Lemma
From the previously collected data {(xi, θi, yi)}t−1i=1 , a kernel ridge regression estimate of the oppo-
nent’s response function can be obtained at every round t by solving:
arg min
b∈Hk
t−1∑
i=1
(
b(xi, θi)− yi
)2
+ λ‖b‖k (10)
for some regularization parameter λ > 0. The representer theorem (see, e.g., [30]) allows to obtain a
standard closed form solution to (10), which is given by:
µt(x, θ) = kt(x, θ)
T
(
Kt + λIt
)−1
yt
where yt = [y1, . . . , yt]
T is the vector of observations, kt(x, θ) =
[k(x, θ, x1, θ1), . . . , k(x, θ, xt, θt)]
T and [Kt]i,j = k(xi, θi, xj , θj) is the kernel matrix. The
estimate µt(·, ·) can also be interpreted as the posterior mean function of the corresponding Bayesian
Gaussian process model [30]. Similarly, one can also obtain a closed-form expression for the
variance of such estimator, also interpreted as posterior covariance function, via the expression:
σ2t (x, θ) = k(x, θ, x, θ)− kt(x, θ)T
(
Kt + λIt
)−1
kt(x, θ) .
A standard result [1, 34], which forms the basis of ours and of many other Bayesian Optimization
algorithms, shows that the functions µt(·, ·) and σt(·, ·) can be used to construct confidence intervals
that contain the true opponent’s response function values with high probability. We report such result
in the following main lemma, which states that given the previously observed opponent’s actions, its
response function belongs (with high probability) to the interval [µt(·, ·)± βtσt(·, ·)], for a carefully
chosen confidence parameter βt ≥ 0.
Lemma 4 Let b ∈ Hk such that ‖b‖Hk ≤ B and consider the regularized least-squares estimate
µt(·, ·) with regularization constant λ > 0. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ,
the following holds simultaneously over all x ∈ X , θ ∈ Θ and t ≥ 1:
|µt(x, θ)− b(x, θ)| ≤ βtσt(x, θ),
where βt = σλ−1
√
2 log ( 1δ ) + log(det(It +Kt/λ)) + λ
−1/2B.
A.1 The case of multiple outputs
We consider the case of multi-dimensional responses yt = b(xt, θt) + t ∈ Rm, where {t[i], i =
1, . . . ,m} are i.i.d. and conditionally σ-sub-Gaussian with independence over time steps. In this
case, posterior mean and variance functions can be obtained respectively as:
µt(x, θ) =
[
µt(x, θ, 1) , . . . , µt(x, θ,m)
]T
, σ2t (x, θ) =
[
σ2t (x, θ, 1) , . . . , σ
2
t (x, θ,m)
]T
,
where µt(x, θ, i) is the posterior mean estimate computed as in (2) using responses yt =
[y1[i], . . . yt[i]]
T and σ2t (x, θ, i) is the corresponding variance, for i = 1, . . . ,m. Moreover, Lemma 4
shows that a careful choice of the confidence parameter βt implies that, with probability at least
1−mδ, |µt(x, θ, i)− b(x, θ)[i]| ≤ βtσt(x, θ, i) for any x ∈ X , θ ∈ Θ, and i = 1, . . . ,m. Hence, in
this case the vector-valued functions µt(·, ·) and σt(·, ·) can be used to construct a high-confidence
upper and lower confidence bounds of the unknown function b(·, ·).
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B Proof of Theorem 1
Our goal is to bound the learner’s cumulative regret R(T ) = maxx∈X
∑T
t=1 r(x, b(x, θt)) −∑T
t=1 r(xt, yt), where xt’s are the actions chosen by the learner and yt = b(xt, θt) is the opponent’s
response at every round t.
To bound R(T ), we first observe that the “optimistic" reward function r˜t(·, ·) upper bounds the
learner’s rewards at every round t. Recall that for every x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ, it is defined as:
r˜t(x, θ) := max
y
r(x, y)
s.t. y ∈ [lcbt(x, θ), ucbt(x, θ)].
Moreover, according to Lemma 4, with probability 1− δ it holds:
lcbt(x, θ) ≤ b(x, θ) ≤ ucbt(x, θ) ∀x ∈ X ,∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀t ≥ 1 (11)
with lcbt(·, ·) and ucbt(·, ·) defined in (4) and setting βt as in Lemma 4. Therefore, conditioning on
the event (11) holding true, by definition of r˜t(·, ·) we have:
r˜t(x, θ) ≥ r(x, b(x, θ)) ∀x ∈ X ,∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀t ≥ 1 . (12)
By using (12) and defining x? = arg maxx∈X
∑T
t=1 r(x, b(x, θt)), the regret of the learner can now
be bounded as:
R(T ) =
T∑
t=1
r(x?, b(x?, θt))−
T∑
t=1
r(xt, yt)
≤
T∑
t=1
r˜t(x
?, θt)−
T∑
t=1
r(xt, yt)
=
T∑
t=1
r˜t(x
?, θt)− r˜t(xt, θt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R1(T )
+
T∑
t=1
r˜t(xt, θt)− r(xt, yt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R2(T )
,
where in the last equality we add and subtract the term
∑T
t=1 r˜t(xt, θt). We proceed by bounding the
terms R1(T ) and R2(T ) separately.
We start by bounding R2(T ). Let y?t = arg maxy∈[lcbt(xt,θt),ucbt(xt,θt)] r(xt, y). Then, by definition
of r˜t(·, ·) we have
R2(T ) =
T∑
t=1
r(xt, y
?
t )− r(xt, yt) ≤ Lr
T∑
t=1
‖(xt − xt, y?t − yt)‖2
≤ Lr
T∑
t=1
|y?t − yt| ≤ Lr
T∑
t=1
(
ucbt(xt, θt)− lcbt(xt, θt)
)
≤ 2LrβT
T∑
t=1
σt(xt, θt) ≤ 4LrβT
√
TλγT .
The first inequality follows from the Lipschitz continuity of r(·, ·), the second one is due to the event
in (11) holding true, and the third one is by the definition of ucbt(·, ·) and lcbt(·, ·) and since βt is
increasing in t. The last inequality follows since
∑T
t=1 σt(θt, xt) ≤ 2
√
TλγT (see, e.g., Lemma 4
in [8]) for λ ≥ 1 and assuming k(·, ·) ≤ 1. 5
To complete the proof it remains to bound the regret term
R1(T ) =
T∑
t=1
r˜t(x
?, θt)− r˜t(xt, θt) . (13)
5In case we have k(·, ·) ≤ L for some L > 0 then the result holds for λ ≥ L.
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Note that R1(T ) corresponds exactly to the regret that the learner incurs in an adversarial online
learning problem in the case of sequence of reward functions r˜t(·, θt), t = 1, . . . , T . Moreover, in
Algorithm 1, the learner plays actions xt’s according to the standard MW update algorithm which
makes use of these functions in the form of full-information feedback.
Therefore, by using the standard online learning results (e.g., [7, Corollary 4.2]), if the learning
parameter η is selected as η =
√
8 log |X |
T in the MW algorithm, then with probability at least 1− δ,
R1(T ) ≤
√
1
2T log |X |+
√
1
2T log (
1
δ ) .
We remark that the above bound holds even when the rewards functions (in our case the types θt’s)
are chosen by an adaptive adversary that can observe the learner’s randomized strategy pt (see, e.g.,
[7, Remark 4.3]).
Having bounded R1(T ), by using the standard probability arguments we obtain that with probability
at least (1− 2δ),
R(T ) ≤
√
1
2T log |X |+
√
1
2T log (
1
δ ) + 4LrβT
√
TλγT .
C Proof of Corollary 2
For any sequence of types θt’s and learner actions xt’s, we follow the same proof steps as in proof of
Theorem 1 to show that, with probability at least 1− δ, the learner’s regret can be bounded as
R(T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
r˜t(x
?, θt)− r˜t(xt, θt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R1(T )
+
T∑
t=1
r˜t(xt, θt)− r(xt, yt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R2(T )
,
where r˜t(·, ·) is the “optimistic" reward function defined in (6). Moreover, as we show in the proof of
Theorem 2, R2(T ) ≤ 4Lr βT
√
TλγT with probability at least 1− δ.
Finally, we use the assumption θt = θ¯, ∀t ≥ 1, and the strategy in (8) to show that R1(T ) ≤ 0. By
assuming θt = θ¯ for t ≥ 1, we can write
R1(T ) =
T∑
t=1
r˜t
(
x?, θ¯
)− r˜t(xt, θ¯) ,
which is at most zero as the learner selects xt = arg maxx∈X r˜t
(
x, θ¯
)
at every round.
The corollary’s statement then follows by observing that R(T ) ≤ R2(T ) with probability at least
1− δ.
D Proof of Corollary 3
As discussed in Section 3.3, in a repeated Stackelberg game the decision xt ∈ ∆nl represents the
leader’s mixed strategy at round t, where ∆nl is the nl- dimensional simplex. Hence, the regret of
the leader can be written as
R(T ) = max
x∈∆nl
T∑
t=1
r(x, b(x, θt))−
T∑
t=1
r(xt, yt) ,
where b(·, θt) is the best-response function of the follower of type θt.
Before bounding the leader’ regret, recall that the algorithm resulting from Corollary 3 consists of
playing STACKELUCB over a finite set D, which is a discretization of the leader’s mixed strategy
space ∆nl . We choose D such that ‖x− [x]D‖1 ≤
√
nl/T/(Lr(1 + Lb)) for every x ∈ ∆nl , where
[x]D is the closest point to x in D. A natural way to obtain such a set D for the leader is to discretize
the simplex ∆nl with a uniform grid of |D| = (Lr(1 + Lb)
√
nlT )
nl points.
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Define x? = arg maxx∈∆nl
∑T
t=1 r(x, b(x, θt)), and let [x
?]D be the closest point to x? in D. Then,
the leader’s regret can be rewritten as:
R(T ) =
T∑
t=1
r(x?, b(x?, θt))−
T∑
t=1
r(xt, yt)
=
T∑
t=1
r
(
x?, b(x?, θt)
)− r([x?]D, b([x?]D, θt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
RA(T )
+
T∑
t=1
r
(
[x?]D, b([x?]D, θt)
)− r(xt, yt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RB(T )
where we have added and subtracted the term
∑T
t=1 r
(
[x?]D, b([x?]D, θt)
)
. At this point, note that
the regret term RB(T ) is precisely the regret the leader incurs with respect to the best point in the set
D. Therefore, since the points xt are selected by STACKELUCB over the same set, by Theorem 1
with probability at least 1− 2δ,
RB(T ) ≤
√
1
2T log |D|+
√
1
2T log (
1
δ ) + 4LrβT
√
TλγT . (14)
The term RA(T ) can be bounded using our Lipschitz assumptions on r(·) and b(·, θt) as follows:
RA(T ) =
T∑
t=1
r(x?, b(x?, θt))− r([x?]D, b([x?]D, θt))
=
T∑
t=1
r(x?, b(x?, θt))− r(x?, b([x?]D, θt)) + r(x?, b([x?]D, θt))− r([x?]D, b([x?]D, θt))
≤
T∑
t=1
Lr ‖x? − [x?]D‖1 + Lr ‖b(x?, θt)− b([x?]D, θt)‖1
≤
T∑
t=1
Lr ‖x? − [x?]D‖1 + LrLb ‖x? − [x?]D‖1
=
T∑
t=1
Lr(1 + Lb)‖x? − [x?]D‖1 ≤
T∑
t=1
Lr(1 + Lb)
√
nl/T
Lr(1 + Lb)
=
√
nlT .
In the first inequality we have used Lr-Lipschitzness of r(·), in the second one Lb-Lipschitzness of
b(·, θt), and the last inequality follows by the property of the constructed set D.
The statement of the corollary then follows by summing the bounds of RA(T ) and RB(T ) and
substituting in (14) the cardinality |D| = (Lr(1 + Lb)
√
nlT )
nl .
E Experimental setup of Section 4.1
In this section, we describe the experimental setup of Section 4.1. First, we explain how we generated
the set of routing plans X for the network operator, and the demand profiles θt’s for the other users
in the network. Then, we detail how the network congestion level yt is determined as a function of
the operator’s plan and the users’ demand profiles. Finally, we summarize the rest of the parameters
chosen for our experiment.
We generate a finite set X of possible routing plans for the operator as follows. The operator can
decide to route 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100% of the 300 units from origin to destination (blue and
green nodes in Figure 1); moreover, the routed units can be split in 3 groups of equal size, and each
group can take a potentially different route among the 3 shortest routes from origin to destination.
This results in a total of |X | = 41 possible plans for the operator. At each round t, the plan chosen by
the operator is represented by the occupancy vector xt ∈ R|E|≥0 indicating how many units are routed
through each edge of the network (see Section 4.1).
We use the demand data from [20, 36] to build the users’ demand profile θt ∈ R552≥0 at each round,
indicating how many users want to travel between any two nodes of the network (it represents the
type of opponent the operator is facing at round t). This data consists of units of demands associated
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with 24 · 23 = 552 origin-destination pairs. Each entry θt[i] is obtained by scaling the demand
corresponding to the origin-destination pair i by a random variable uniformly distributed in [0, 1], for
i = 1, . . . , 552.
Given operator’s plan xt and demands θt, in Section 4.1 we modeled the averaged congestion over
the network edges with the relation
yt = b(xt, θt) .
The function b(·, ·) includes 1) the network congestion model and 2) how the users choose their routes
in response to the operator’s plan xt. Below, we explain in detail these two components.
Congestion model. Congestion model and related data are taken from [20, 36]. Data consist of nodes’
2-D positions and edges’ capacities and free-flow times, while the congestion model corresponds
to the widely used used Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) model. The congestion in the network is
determined as a function of the edges’ occupancy (i.e., how many units traverse each edge), which
can be represented by the occupancy vector z ∈ R|E|≥0 . Then, according to the BPR model, the travel
time to traverse a given edge e ∈ E increases with the edge’s occupancy z[e] ∈ R≥0 following to the
relation:
te(z) = ce ·
[
1 + 0.15
(z[e]
Ce
)4]
e = 1, . . . |E| , (15)
where ce and Ce are free-flow time and capacity of edge e, respectively.
In our example, given routing plan xt of the network operator and routes chosen by the other users
(below we explain how such routes are chosen as a function of xt), we can compute the occupancy
vector at round t as
zt = xt + ut ,
where the vector ut ∈ R|E|≥0 represents the network occupancy due to the users (ut[e] indicates how
many users are traveling trough edge e, e = 1 . . . |E|). Hence, according to the BPR model, we
define
ce(zt) = 0.15
(zt[e]
Ce
)4
e = 1, . . . |E| , (16)
to be the congestion of edge e at round t. It represents the extra (normalized) time needed to traverse
edge e. Using (16), the averaged congestion over the network edges yt ∈ R+ is computed as
yt =
1
|E|
∑
e∈E
ce(zt) . (17)
Users’ preferences. Given routing plan xt chosen by the network operator, the users choose routes
as follows. We consider the two shortest routes (in terms of distance) between any two nodes in the
network. Then, we let the users select the route with minimum travel time among the two, where
the travel time of each edge is te(xt), computed as in (15). That is, users choose the routes with
minimum travel time, assuming the occupancy of the network is the one caused by the operator.
In our experiment, the operator obtains a noisy observation of yt, where the noise standard deviation
is set to σ = 5. Moreover, we set the trade-off parameter κ = 10 for the operator’s objective, in order
to obtain meaningful trade-offs. Finally, in our experiments we scale by a factor of 0.01 both the
demands and the edges’ capacities taken from [20, 36].
F Supplementary material for Section 4.2
We provide additional details and experimental results for the wildlife conservation task considered
in Section 4.2.
F.1 Poachers’ model and response function
Here, we more formally describe the Subjective Utility model [25] for the poachers and hence the
poachers’ response function used in the experiment.
When poaching at location y, the poachers obtain reward [17]:
Rp(y) = φ(y)− ζ · D(y)
maxyD(y)
, (18)
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Figure 3: Obtained rewards when the rangers know the poachers’ model (OPT), use the proposed algorithm to
update their patrol strategy online (Left), or use GP-UCB ignoring the bi-level rewards’ structure (Right), for
different choices of the confidence parameter βt. When the confidence βt is sufficiently small, the proposed
algorithm consistently discovers the optimal strategy in ∼60 rounds, while GP-UCB either converges to
suboptimal solutions or experiences a slower learning curve.
where φ : R2 → [0, 1] is the park animal density function (see right plots in Figure 2 where φ(·) was
generated as a mixture of Gaussian distributions), D(y) is the distance between y and the poachers’
starting location (we use the starting location depicted as red square in Figure 2), and ζ is a trade-off
parameter measuring the importance that poachers give toD(y) compared to φ(y). Using (18), the ex-
pected utility of the poachers (unknown to the rangers) follows the Subjective Utility (SU) model [25]:
SU(x, y) =
25∑
i=1
(
− ω1f(x[i]) + ω2Rp(y) + ω3P pi
)
· 1i(y) ,
where f is the S-shaped function f(p) = (δpγ)/(δpγ + (1− p)γ) from [17], Rp(y) is the reward for
poaching at location y, P pi < 0 is a penalty for poaching in cell i, and the coefficients ω1, ω2, ω3 ≥ 0
describe the poachers’ preferences. Given a patrol strategy x, hence, we assume that the poachers
select location y = b(x) = arg maxy SU(x, y) to maximize their own utility function.
6
For the poachers’ utility we use w1 = −3, w2 = w3 = 1, δ = 2, γ = 3, ζ = 0.5, P pi = −1, while
we set Rri = 1, P
r
i = −φ(y) for the rangers’ reward function.
F.2 Additional experimental results
We provide additional experimental results comparing the performance of the proposed algorithm,
which learns the response function b(·, θˆ) and exploits the bi-level structure of the reward function,
with the one of GP-UCB [34] (standard baseline for GP bandit optimization) which learns directly
the function g(·) = r(·, b(·, θ¯)). We run both algorithms using a Màtern kernel, with kernel hyper-
parameters computed offline data via a maximum likelihood method over 100 random data points.
To run our algorithm we set noise standard deviation σ to 2% of the width of the park area, while
for GP-UCB we set σ to 2% of the rewards’ range. In Figure 3 we compare the performance of the
two algorithms for different choices of the confidence parameter βt. For sufficiently small values of
βt, the proposed approach consistently converges to the optimal solution in ∼60 iterations, while
GP-UCB either converges to suboptimal solutions or displays a slower learning curve.
6In the case of more than one best response, ties are broken in an arbitrary but consistent manner.
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